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Abstract. Episodic memories are typically composed of perceptual information derived from the external 
environment and representations of internal states (e.g., one’s thoughts during prior episodes). To date, 
however, research has mostly focused on the remembrance of external stimuli, such that little is known 
about how internal mentation is represented within episodic memory. In the present fMRI study, we 
examined the neural correlates of these two components of episodic memories using a novel method of 
cuing memories from photographs taken during real-life events. We found that, compared to corresponding 
semantic memory tasks, memories for internal thoughts and external elements were associated with activity 
in brain areas supporting episodic recollection. Most importantly, however, the two kinds of memories also 
showed differential activation in large-scale brain networks: the remembrance of external elements was 
associated with greater activity in the dorsal attention network, whereas memories of internal thoughts 
mainly recruited default network areas. These findings shed new light on the representation of internal and 
external aspects of prior experience within episodic memory. The default network may contribute to the 
reinstatement of thoughts experienced during past events, whereas the dorsal attention network may support 
the allocation of attention to visuo-spatial features within episodic memory representations. 
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 Historically, research on episodic memory has mostly focused on the remembrance of stimuli from 
the external environment, such as lists of words or pictures (Baddeley et al. 2002; Tulving 2002). However, 
recent advances in the study of human cognition have shown that we spend a substantial amount of time 
and resources generating thoughts and images that are decoupled from sensory input (Andrews-Hanna, 
Smallwood, et al. 2014; Christoff et al. 2016; Smallwood and Schooler 2015), which may play important 
roles in planning, decision making, mood regulation, and creativity (Andrews-Hanna 2012; Beaty et al. 
2016). Being able to remember one’s own thoughts and ideas (e.g., possible solutions to daily life issues, 
evaluations of recently introduced individuals, personal interpretations of events) may critically contribute 
to adaptive cognitive and social functioning, yet little is currently known about memory for internal 
mentation. Most notably, commonalities and differences in the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
the retrieval of inner thoughts versus stimuli from the external environment remain to be investigated in 
detail. 
 Memory for thoughts has been previously investigated in the context of reality monitoring 
judgments (i.e., as a means to determine whether a past event was real or imagined; Johnson 1988; Horton 
et al. 2007), but it has rarely been a topic of study in itself (but see Brewer 1988; Muhlert et al. 2010). 
Neuroimaging studies have revealed that the medial prefrontal cortex shows higher activity when retrieving 
internally generated versus externally derived source details during recognition memory tasks (for review, 
see Simons et al. 2017). Furthermore, it has been shown that memory vividness ratings for internal (i.e., 
thoughts and feelings) and external (i.e., perceptual) contextual details during word recognition correlate 
with different patterns of hippocampal connectivity (Ford and Kensinger 2016). Taken together, these 
studies suggest that memory for internal versus external aspects of past events is supported, at least in part, 
by distinct mechanisms. However, the conclusions that can be drawn from these studies are limited by their 
focus on memory for laboratory stimuli, which may be fundamentally different from memory for events in 
one’s life (Chen et al. 2017; McDermott et al. 2009; Roediger and McDermott 2013; but see Rissman et al. 
2016). 
Memory for real-life events relies on a distributed set of brain regions that include the Default 
Network (DN; Raichle et al. 2001) and fronto-parietal areas (Addis et al. 2004, 2012; Benoit and Schacter 
2015; Cabeza and St Jacques 2007; Kim 2012; McDermott et al. 2009; Spreng et al. 2009). The experience 
of remembering such events is typically composed of multiple components (e.g., sensory and contextual 
details, thoughts, emotions; Johnson et al. 1988; Rubin et al. 2003), and it is therefore likely that the 
memories produced in previous neuroimaging studies of real-world memory retrieval involved a mix of 
internal and external elements from prior experience (Andrews-Hanna, Saxe, et al. 2014). It remains an 
open question whether these two types of information rely on distinct regions within the brain network 
supporting episodic remembering.  
 Here we sought to address this question using a novel paradigm to elicit memories for external 
details versus internal thoughts occurring during real-life events. Participants were first asked to perform a 
30-minute walk on a university campus while wearing a lifelogging camera that continuously and 
automatically took pictures from the first-person perspective (Chow and Rissman 2017). They then 
immediately underwent an fMRI session in which they saw short sequences of pictures from their walk, in 
response to which they had to remember either associated elements from the external environment or 
internal thoughts that they experienced during the walk. Using these two task conditions, the first aim of 
this research was to identify brain regions that exhibit differential activity during the retrieval of internal 
versus external aspects of past events.  
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A second aim of the present study was to investigate whether these brain regions are specifically 
involved in remembering external versus internal details from specific past episodes or whether they are 
also engaged when processing corresponding (i.e., perceptual versus reflective) information in semantic 
memory. Recent meta-analyses have shown that the neural correlates of episodic and semantic memory 
tasks overlap substantially, particularly within the DN (Binder et al. 2009; Kim 2016). Yet, it remains 
unclear whether episodic and semantic memory share common neural substrates for both perceptual and 
reflective memory representations. To investigate this question, two additional tasks were included in this 
study, which involved the mental representation of visual scenes versus reflective thoughts that were 
decontextualized from any specific past event. More specifically, participants performed a scene 
construction task (Hassabis and Maguire 2007) in which they had to mentally visualize common daily life 
objects in their typical spatial context, and a conceptual reflection task in which they had to mentally 
generate definitions of abstract words. Taken together, the four tasks included in this study constituted a 2 
× 2 factorial design that allowed us to investigate commonalities and differences in the processing of 
perceptual versus reflective information in episodic and semantic memory. 
 We were particularly interested in examining the respective contribution of the default, dorsal 
attention, and frontoparietal control networks to the retrieval of internal thoughts and external elements 
from episodic memory. As noted above, the DN is consistently involved in remembering real-life events 
and research has shown that it comprises at least two subsystems that converge on two hub-like core 
regions—the posterior cingulate cortex and anterior medial prefrontal cortex (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010; 
Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, et al. 2014). The first subsystem is anchored in the dorsal part of the medial 
prefrontal cortex and is thought to play an important role in introspecting about mental states and in 
processing abstract (compared to perceptual) information (Christoff et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2010, 2013), 
whereas the second subsystem involves the medial temporal lobe and supports the retrieval and binding of 
episodic elements (Andrews-Hanna 2012; Andrews-Hanna, Saxe, et al. 2014). Based on this fractionation 
of the DN and previous studies of reality monitoring (Simons et al. 2017), we predicted that the retrieval of 
internal and external aspects of past events would both rely on DN regions but that memories for internal 
thoughts would recruit the medial prefrontal cortex and other regions of the dorsal medial subsystem (such 
as the lateral temporal cortex; Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, et al. 2014) to a greater extent than memories 
for external elements.  
The second network of interest in this study was the Dorsal Attention Network (DAN), which 
supports the top-down control of visuo-spatial attention and thus plays an important role in processing 
stimuli from the external environment (Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Spreng et al. 2013). The DN and DAN 
often show anticorrelated activity, which has led to the view that they support opposite or competitive 
functions respectively corresponding to the processing of internal versus external information (e.g., Fox et 
al. 2005; Sestieri et al. 2010). However, this view has been challenged by recent studies showing that the 
DAN can be transiently activated during memory retrieval (in the absence of external cues), and shows an 
increased functional connectivity with the core midline regions of the DN in this condition (Kragel and 
Polyn 2015; see also Dixon et al. 2017). While this research reveals a role of the DAN in episodic memory 
retrieval, its precise function remains unclear. Here, we investigated the possibility that the DAN may not 
only support the processing of stimuli from the immediate external environment (Corbetta and Shulman 
2002), but may also play a role in processing internally-generated information referring to aspects of the 
external world, such as the sensory-perceptual components of episodic memories. Support for this proposal 
comes from a source memory study showing that remembering prior perceptual versus conceptual 
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judgements about visual stimuli recruits DAN areas (Dobbins and Wagner 2005). More generally, studies 
on mental imagery have shown that some DAN areas (including the precentral sulcus, superior parietal 
lobule, and visual temporal areas) are not only involved in visual perception but also in visual mental 
imagery (Ganis et al. 2004; Pearson et al. 2015). To further test the hypothesized role of the DAN in the 
processing of perceptual memory representations, we examined whether the DAN exhibits increased 
activation when retrieving perceptual compared to reflective information from episodic and semantic 
memory.  
 Finally, besides the DN and DAN, we were also interested in the contribution of the frontoparietal 
control network (FPCN, Vincent et al. 2008; Spreng et al. 2010), which is also commonly engaged during 
episodic memory retrieval (Benoit and Schacter 2015; Cabeza and St Jacques 2007; Kim 2012; McDermott 
et al. 2009). The FPCN is thought to support effortful control processes to meet task goals, and may play a 
role in integrating information from the DAN and DN (Gao and Lin 2012; Spreng et al. 2010; Vincent et 
al. 2008). During episodic remembering, this network might support the strategic retrieval, monitoring, and 
recombination of episodic details to form an integrated and coherent representation of the remembered 
event (Benoit and Schacter 2015; St Jacques and Cabeza 2012; St Jacques and De Brigard 2015). A previous 
fMRI study (Dobbins and Wagner 2005) found that retrieving internal source information mainly recruited 
left FPCN areas, whereas retrieving external source information was associated with right FPCN activity. 
These results suggest that the retrieval of internal thoughts versus external elements might be associated 
with distinct activations within the FPCN. 
 In summary, the aims of the present study were twofold. Our first goal was to investigate the neural 
correlates of episodic memory for internal thoughts versus elements from the external environment 
experienced during real-life events. Second, we aimed at determining commonalities and differences in the 
processing of perceptual versus reflective information in episodic and semantic memory. To do so, we used 
four task conditions that constituted a 2 (perceptual versus reflective) × 2 (episodic versus semantic) 
factorial design and focused our analyses on three major brain networks commonly involved in memory 
retrieval and externally versus internally directed attention: the DN, DAN, and FPCN. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 27 right-handed young adults (20 women, mean age = 25.11 years, SD = 4.93, 
range = 19-34 years). All were students or employees at the University of Liège and were familiar with the 
university campus. None of the participants reported a current use of psychoactive medication or a history 
of neurological or psychiatric disorder. Six additional participants were tested but were excluded from the 
analyses because of excessive head movement during image acquisition (one participant) or task 
noncompliance either during the pre-scan walk (one participant) or in the scanner (four participants1). All 
participants gave their written informed consent to take part in the study, which was approved by the ethics 
committee of the Medical School of the University of Liège and was performed in accordance with the 
ethical standards described in the Declaration of Helsinki (1964).  
                                                           
1 These four participants completed the two task runs, but the debriefing revealed that they either (1) did not press the response key to indicate 
that they had generated the appropriate mental content, (2) recalled memories of specific past events in the scene construction condition, (3) 
did not specifically focus on external elements or internal thoughts during the recall conditions, or (4) felt physically uneasy during the second 





Pre-scan Walk with Lifelogging Device 
Immediately before scanning, participants were instructed to perform a walk on the campus of the 
University of Liège while wearing an Autographer (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autographer). The 
Autographer is a lifelogging device consisting of a small wearable camera that automatically, continuously, 
and silently takes pictures through a 136° fish-eye lens according to an algorithm based on several electronic 
sensors (e.g, color, temperature, accelerometer, magnetometer, etc.). The main advantage of this device is 
that it provides a dynamic flow of pictures taken from the first-person perspective without disrupting 
ongoing experience by actively taking photographs. A growing number of neuroimaging and behavioral 
studies have shown that the images taken by this kind of device can be used as individually personalized 
retrieval cues that are particularly effective in eliciting vivid episodic memories (Chow and Rissman 2017; 
St Jacques and De Brigard 2015; St Jacques et al. 2013).  
The walk consisted in going to several different buildings on the university campus to perform 
actions chosen to simulate activities that college students perform in their daily life. More specifically, 
participants had to perform four actions at different locations on the campus in the following order: (a) to 
post a letter in a mailbox, (b) to buy a local newspaper at an indoor newsstand, (c) to buy a drink at a 
cafeteria, and (d) to look on the wall of an amphitheater to check the title of a lecture. Following these 
actions, the participants were asked (e) to come back to the testing room for further instructions regarding 
the next parts of the study (see Fig. 1a). Participants could take the route they wanted to go from building 
to building between each action, but they were asked not to perform any additional action during the walk 
(e.g., listening to music, using their smartphones, discussing with acquaintances, etc.). Otherwise, 
participants were asked to behave normally (i.e., as they would in their daily life) and they were given a 
sealed envelope for the first action, as well as five euros to buy the newspaper and the drink. On average, 
the entire walk lasted 34.11 minutes (SD = 4.43). Pictures were taken by the Autographer on average every 
6.69 seconds (SD = 0.30); the mean total number of pictures taken per walk was 307.30 (SD = 45.40). 
Participants were informed that pictures taken during their walk would be presented in the fMRI session 
but, importantly, no mention was made of the memory tasks. As a cover story, participants were told that 
they will have to perform in the scanner aesthetic judgments on the pictures. 
fMRI Tasks 
Immediately following their walk, participants underwent an fMRI session involving four different 
conditions (see Fig. 1b). The task comprised 24 trials for each condition, which were presented in two runs 
of 48 trials (12 trials per condition in each run). The order of presentation of the trials was randomized with 
the constraint that two trials of the same condition were not presented successively and were not more than 
seven trials apart.  
Episodic memory tasks. In the two episodic memory conditions (hereafter referred to as the 
external element and internal thought conditions), participants were asked to remember either elements 
from the external environment or internal thoughts that they experienced during the walk. Each trial began 
with a one-second fixation cross followed by the presentation of a series of five consecutive pictures taken 
during the pre-scan walk of the participant (800 ms per pictures). Each sequence of pictures was determined 
randomly from the pool of pictures taken during the walk, with the following constraints: (a) selected 
pictures were displayed only once and (b) two consecutive sequences of pictures were not associated with 
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the same condition (e.g., if pictures 1 to 5 were used for the external element condition, then picture 6 to 10 
were used for the internal thought condition). This latter constraint was made in order to maximize the 
similarity of the cuing sequences between the two conditions without presenting the same pictures several 
times across trials. In total, 240 pictures were presented (24 trials*5 pictures per condition). When more 
than 240 pictures were taken during the walk, the presented sequences of pictures were selected such that 
they covered the entire route. Each set of selected pictures was reviewed by the experimenter before 
scanning to ensure the absence of excessive blurring or lighting issues, so that the depicted segments of the 
walk were easily recognizable. 
 
Figure 1. Panel A. illustrates the walk performed on the campus of the University of Liège (Belgium) prior entering the scanner. 
Participants had to (1) leave the testing room, (2) put a letter in a mailbox, (3) buy a newspaper at an indoor newsstand, (4) buy 
a drink at a cafeteria, and (5) look on the wall of an amphitheater to check the title of a lecture. Panel B. illustrates the structure 
of trials in the episodic (above the timeline) and semantic (below the timeline) memory conditions. In the scanner, participants 
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were first presented with sequences of five consecutive pictures from their walk (episodic conditions) or five scrambled pictures 
(semantic conditions). In the two episodic memory conditions, the pictures were followed by a screen asking participants to 
remember either an internal thought that they experienced during the walk (internal thought condition) or an element from the 
external environment that was not displayed in detail in the preceding sequence of pictures (external element condition). In the 
semantic memory conditions, participants were asked to either mentally construct a visual scene associated with an object (scene 
construction condition) or to reflect on the meaning of semantically associated words (conceptual reflection condition). For each 
condition, participants were asked to press a response key once they had retrieved the required information, and then to focus on 
their mental representation until the disappearance of the screen (which was presented for 16 seconds). Finally, each trial ended 
with the successive presentation of two Likert scales asking participants to rate the kind of mental representation that they 
experienced. fMRI analyses focused on the time interval between the key press and the end of the 16 seconds, thus corresponding 
to the main phase of the trials. 
 
During the presentation of each sequence of pictures, participants were asked to focus on the images 
and to try to remember the corresponding moment of the walk. After the last of the five pictures, a second 
fixation cross was shown (with a variable duration ranging between one and three seconds), followed by 
the presentation of written instructions asking participants to remember either an internal thought or an 
element from the external environment. This retrieval phase lasted 16 seconds during which participants 
were first instructed to press a response key as soon as they retrieved the requested information, and then 
to remember this thought or external element in as much detail as possible until the end of the 16 seconds. 
For the external element condition, participants were told that their memory could be of anything that they 
encountered during the walk (e.g., people, objects, events, places, etc.) but it had to be something that was 
not displayed in detail in the immediately preceding sequence of pictures. This latter point was specified to 
ensure that the external element and internal thought conditions both involved the retrieval of information 
that is not directly available in the presented pictures. For the internal thought condition, participants were 
told that they could remember any thought they had experienced during the walk, be it directly related to 
the walk itself (e.g., thoughts about the actions they had to perform) or not (e.g., thoughts about personal 
concerns). Participants were also explained that, depending on the current trial condition, they should try to 
focus their attention only on external elements or on internal thoughts. Finally, the instructions specified 
that participants should retrieve a different external element or internal thought for each trial.  
Following the retrieval phase, participants were shown a one-second fixation cross followed by the 
successive presentation of two four-point Likert scales, the purpose of which was to obtain a subjective 
assessment of the extent to which each retrieved memory involved elements from the external environment 
(first scale) and internal thoughts (second scale). The response options were identical for the two scales and 
ranged from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 4 ‘a lot.’ Responses were self-paced with a maximum of five seconds per 
scale. 
Semantic memory tasks. The two semantic conditions were unrelated to the pre-scan walk and 
required either to imagine a visual scene (scene construction condition) or to reflect upon the meaning of 
words (conceptual reflection condition, see Fig. 1b). The timing of these two conditions was identical to 
the two episodic memory conditions. At the beginning of each trial, participants were presented with a 
sequence of scrambled pictures (the sequences of pictures were the same as in the episodic memory 
conditions, except that each image was cut into 3072 squares of 14 by 14 pixels that were then randomly 
rearranged within each frame). During this phase, participants were simply told to look the sequence of 
images. Next, written instructions (i.e. “scene imagination” or “meaning reflection”) were presented on the 
screen for 16 seconds along with either an object name for the scene construction condition or an abstract 
word for the conceptual reflection condition. Twenty-four French words were selected for each condition, 
based on the norms of Desrochers and Thompson (2009). The two set of words differed in their degree of 
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imageability [t(46) = 50.91; p < .001; M = 6.60, SD = 0.31 for scene construction; M = 2.61, SD = 0.23 for 
conceptual reflection] but not in terms of their subjective frequency [t(46) = 0.20; p = .84; M = 4.71, SD = 
0.54 for scene construction; M = 4.68, SD = 0.48 for conceptual reflection] or number of letters [t(46) = -
0.24; p = .81; M = 7.58, SD = 1.82 for scene construction; M = 7.71, SD = 1.83 for conceptual reflection]. 
The full list of words is presented in Table S1. 
In the scene construction condition, participants were asked to press the response key as soon as 
they found a place commonly associated with the object named on the screen, and then to imagine a scene 
involving the place and object in as much detail as possible until the end of the 16 seconds. It was specified 
that the imagined scene should not refer to personal memories (e.g., in response to the word “parasol”, one 
could imagine a typical beach with a parasol and other features, but not remember a specific past experience 
involving this place and object). In the conceptual reflection condition, participants were asked to press the 
response key as soon as they found a word that was semantically associated with the word on the screen, 
and then to reflect on the meaning of the two words by mentally defining each of them (i.e., as if they had 
to explain their meaning to somebody else) until the end of the 16 seconds. In both conditions, trials ended 
by the successive presentation of two four-point Likert scales assessing to what extent each trial involved 
visual images (first scale) and inner speech (second scale). The response options and duration of the two 
scales were identical to those used in the episodic memory conditions. Participants kept their eyes open for 
the whole duration of each trial in each of the four conditions. 
 
Post-scan Debriefing  
 Immediately after the fMRI session, the participants were shown the sequences of pictures for 20 of 
the trials (five randomly chosen per conditions) that they performed in the fMRI session. For each trial, 
they were asked to describe the external element, internal thought, place, or associated word that they 
generated while lying in the scanner. This was used as a manipulation check to determine whether the 
participants correctly performed the four tasks in the scanner. Participants were also asked to rate on seven-
point Likert scales (a) to what extent they had guessed during the walk that they would receive a memory 
task in the scanner (ranging from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘completely’), (b) to what extent the scenes they 
imagined in the scene imagination condition were identical to memories of specific past events (ranging 
from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘completely’), and (c) the subjective difficulty of each of the four conditions 
(ranging from 1 = ‘very easy’ to 7 ‘very difficult’). In addition to the Likert scales, participants were asked 
to estimate the number of times they remembered the same external element or internal thought in different 
trials, and the number of times they remembered something that was part of the pictures (rather than an 
additional element) in the external element condition. 
 
fMRI Data Acquisition  
Data were acquired on a whole-body 3 Tesla scanner (Magnetom Prisma, Siemens Medical 
Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) operated with a 20-channel receiver head coil and using a T2*-weighted 
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 2260 ms, TE = 30 ms, FA 90°, matrix size 72 × 72 × 36, voxel 
size 3 × 3 × 3 mm³). Thirty-six 3 mm thick transverse slices (FOV 216 × 216 mm²) were acquired, with a 
distance factor of 25% and interleaved slice ordering, covering the whole brain. Around 590 functional 
volumes were obtained for each run of the task. The first five volumes were discarded to account for T1 
saturation effects. After the EPI acquisitions for the two runs of the task, field maps were generated from a 
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double echo gradient-recalled sequence (TR = 634 ms, TE = 10 and 12.46 ms, FoV = 192 × 192 mm², 64 × 
64 matrix, 40 transverse slices with 3 mm thickness and 25% gap, flip angle = 90°, bandwidth = 260 
Hz/pixel) and used to correct echo-planar images for geometric distortion due to field inhomogeneities. A 
structural MR scan was obtained between the two runs of the task [T1-weighted 3D magnetization-prepared 
rapid acquisition gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence, TR = 1900 ms, TE = 2.19 ms, FOV 256 × 240 mm², 
matrix size 256 × 240 × 224, voxel size 1 × 1 × 1 mm]. Head movement was minimized by restraining the 
subject’s head using a vacuum cushion. Stimuli were displayed on a screen positioned at the rear of the 
scanner, which the subject could comfortably see through a mirror mounted on the standard head coil.  
 
fMRI Data Analyses 
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM12 software (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc.). EPI time 
series were corrected for motion and distortion with “Realign and Unwarp” (Andersson et al. 2001) using 
the generated field map together with the FieldMap toolbox (Hutton et al. 2002). A mean realigned 
functional image was then calculated by averaging all the realigned and unwarped functional scans, and the 
structural T1-image was coregistered to this mean functional image (rigid body transformation optimized 
to maximize the normalized mutual information between the two images). The mapping from subject to 
MNI space was estimated from the structural image with the “unified segmentation” approach (Ashburner 
and Friston 2005). The warping parameters were then separately applied to the functional and structural 
images to produce normalized images of resolution 2 × 2 × 2 mm³ and 1 × 1 × 1 mm³, respectively. Finally, 
the warped functional images were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8-mm full-width at half 
maximum.  
For each participant, BOLD responses were first modeled at each voxel, using a general linear model 
(GLM). The main phase of each trial was modeled separately for each condition (i.e., external element, 
internal thought, scene construction, and conceptual reflection) as epoch-related responses (beginning at 
the key press and ending at the disappearance of the screen after 16 seconds) and convolved with the 
canonical hemodynamic response function to create the regressors of interest. Trials for which participants 
did not press the response key or pressed 1 (‘not at all’) to the Likert scale assessing the required mental 
content were modelled in a separate regressor of no interest. The sequences of pictures were also modelled 
as epoch-related responses with two regressors, one for the sequences of scrambled pictures preceding the 
two semantic memory conditions and one for the sequences of normal pictures preceding the two episodic 
memory conditions. The two Likert scales ending each trial were also modelled as epoch-related responses 
with a single regressor across all conditions. Finally, we also modelled the motor responses made during 
the task (i.e., the key press made during the retrieval phase as well as the two responses made to the Likert 
scales of each trial) as an event-related response, again with a single regressor across all conditions. The 
design matrix also included the realignment parameters to account for any residual movement-related effect. 
The canonical hemodynamic response function was used and a high-pass filter was implemented using a 
cutoff period of 128 seconds to remove the low-frequency drifts from the time series. Serial autocorrelations 
were estimated with a restricted maximum likelihood algorithm with an autoregressive model of order 1 (+ 
white noise). 
Based on our 2 × 2 factorial design, a series of linear contrasts were computed to identify the brain 
regions involved in the processing of perceptual versus reflective representations in episodic and semantic 
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memory. We first investigated brain regions showing a main effect for perceptual versus reflective 
representations (External Element and Scene construction > Internal Thought and Conceptual Reflection, 
and vice versa) and regions showing a main effect for episodic versus semantic memory retrieval (External 
Element and Internal Thought > Scene Construction and Conceptual Reflection, and vice versa). Next, the 
interaction terms were examined to determine whether the processing of reflective versus perceptual 
information is associated with specific neural correlates for episodic versus semantic memory: [(Internal 
Thought > External Element) > (Conceptual Reflection > Scene Construction)] and [(External Element > 
Internal thought) > (Scene Construction > Conceptual Reflection)]. Because the first of these interaction 
terms was associated with significant brain activations (see the Results section), we then computed 
individual contrasts to identify brain areas associated with reflective versus perceptual representations 
within episodic (Internal Thought > External Element) and semantic (Conceptual Reflection > Scene 
Construction) memory. On the other hand, given that the second interaction term was not associated with 
significant brain activations, we performed a null conjunction analysis to further determine the neural 
overlap between the two perceptual memory conditions: [(External Element > Internal thought) ∩ (Scene 
Construction > Conceptual Reflection)].  
The contrasts of interest were first computed for each participant and were then entered in random-
effects one-sample t-tests. For all contrasts, we report activations that were statistically significant using a 
threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons (familywise error, FWE) using Gaussian random 
field theory at the voxel level over masks of the three networks of interest (DN, DAN, and FPCN), as 
defined by the seven network parcellation of Yeo et al. (2011). For completeness, we also report additional 
clusters of brain activations whose peak voxels were located outside the three masks and that survived a 
threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE) at the voxel level over the whole brain. 




The behavioral results showed that participants successfully generated the requested information for 
nearly all trials (around 98%, on average, see Table S2), with no difference between conditions [F(3, 78) = 
0.52; p = .67; η
  = .02]. Participants’ ratings of their experience following each trial in the episodic memory 
conditions confirmed that they retrieved elements from the external environment to a greater extent in the 
external element condition than in the internal thought condition [t(26) = 18.27; p < .001; Cohen’s d = 3.58] 
and, conversely, they retrieved more internal thoughts in the internal thought condition than in the external 
element condition [t(26) = 24.30; p < .001; Cohen’s d = 4.77]. Responses for the semantic memory 
conditions also followed the expected pattern, with participants reporting more visual imagery for scene 
construction than conceptual reflection [t(26) = 29.92; p < .001; Cohen’s d = 5.87] and more inner speech 
for conceptual reflection than scene construction [t(26) = 29.21; p < .001; Cohen’s d = 5.73] (see the 
Supplementary Material for more detailed behavioral results).  
fMRI results 
Perceptual versus reflective representations 
We first examined the main effect of the nature of retrieved information (perceptual versus reflective) to 
identify the brain regions involved in the processing of perceptual elements versus reflective thoughts, 




Figure 2. Brain regions activated in the contrasts pertaining to the 2 Representation (perceptual versus reflective) × 2 Memory (episodic 
versus semantic) factorial design. Panels A. and B. respectively show the main effects of representation and memory type. Panel C. shows the 
interaction effects. For all three panels orange/cyan colors correspond to the brain activations that were significant at p < .05 (FWE corrected 
for multiple comparisons) over the whole brain and red/blue colors correspond to the additional brain activations that were significant at p < 
.05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons over masks of the networks of interest). Activations are displayed on an inflated surface map 
(population average landmark surface: PALS-B12) using CARET software (Van Essen 2005). 
 
Results showed that the mental representation of perceptual elements (External Elements and Scene 
construction > Internal Thoughts and Conceptual Reflection) was mainly associated with increased 
activation in bilateral DAN and right FPCN areas, including the bilateral frontal eye fields, superior and 
inferior parietal lobule, temporal motion complex, as well as the right inferior precentral sulcus for the 
DAN, and the right rostral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as well as the anterior inferior parietal cortex 
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for the FPCN (see Fig. 2a, Table S3). Some activated voxels were located in DN areas (mostly in the lateral 
prefrontal cortex, posterior inferior parietal cortex, and midline parietal areas) but an examination of Fig. 
2a shows that these voxels belonged to clusters that were mainly located in the DAN or FPCN and slightly 
extended into DN areas. To get a quantitative estimation of the extent of brain activations in each of the 
three networks, we computed the number of voxels activated in each network relative to the total number 
of voxels comprised in each corresponding mask. This analysis showed that the representation of perceptual 
elements was associated with an activation of 57% of the total number of voxels within the DAN, 28% of 
the total number of voxels within the FCPN, and only 4% of the total number of voxels within the DN. 
Outside of these three networks, other notable clusters of activation were found in the bilateral posterior 
parahippocampal cortex.  
The reverse contrast (Internal Thoughts and Conceptual Reflection > External Elements and Scene 
construction) revealed some clusters of activation in DN areas, mostly in the left lateral temporal cortex and 
left inferior frontal gyrus, but these accounted for only 6% of the total number of voxels in the DN mask 
(see Fig. 2a, Table S4). Almost no voxels were activated in the DAN (0.03%) or FPCN (0.13%). Outside 
of the three networks of interest, activity was detected in the bilateral occipital cortex and right cerebellum. 
Episodic versus semantic memory retrieval 
Next, we examined the brain regions that exhibited differential activity for episodic versus semantic 
memory retrieval, independently of the reflective versus perceptual nature of represented information (see 
Fig. 2b, Table S5). First, we found that the episodic memory conditions were associated with increased 
activation in posterior DN regions, with the largest clusters of activity being located in the bilateral posterior 
inferior parietal lobule and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus. Smaller clusters were also found in the 
lateral temporal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and prefrontal cortex. In total, 29% of DN voxels were 
activated in this contrast. Some clusters of activation were also located in the FPCN (accounting for 12% 
of FPCN voxels), including the right lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices, as well as the precuneus. 
Finally, some activity was also found in posterior areas of the DAN (accounting for a total of 10% of DAN 
voxels), but it mostly consisted of DN and FPCN clusters that extended to the DAN. Outside the three 
masks, additional activity was also found in the posterior hippocampus and parahippocampal areas, 
bilaterally. 
The only region of the DN showing higher activation during semantic compared to episodic memory 
tasks was the left inferior frontal gyrus (2% of DN voxels). Other clusters of activation were located in the 
FPCN, more specifically in the left inferior frontal gyrus and precentral sulcus (4% of FPCN voxels). 
Finally, activations in the DAN were also detected, particularly in the left posterior inferior temporal gyrus 
extending to occipital areas, the left precentral sulcus, and the left lateral parietal cortex (13% of DAN 
voxels). For this contrast, substantial activation was found outside the three networks of interest, with 
clusters of activation being located in the bilateral occipital cortex, supramarginal gyrus, inferior frontal 
gyrus, precentral and postcentral sulci, and cerebellum (see Fig. 2b, Table S6). 
Common and differential activity for reflective versus perceptual representations in episodic and 
semantic memory 
As expected, the preceding analyses indicated that the DAN and right FPCN were activated when 
mentally representing aspects of the external environment. On the other hand, the main effects showed only 
a modest activation of the DN when representing internal thoughts, with no significant activation in core 
DN regions. To investigate the possibility that the contribution of DN areas to reflective representations 
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may depend on the kind of memory involved (i.e., episodic versus semantic), we examined brain regions 
that were associated with the following interaction term: [(Internal Thought > External Element) > 
(Conceptual Reflection > Scene Construction)] (see Fig. 2c, Table S7). This revealed large clusters of 
activation in the DN, especially in its core regions (medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices) and 
in the bilateral posterior inferior parietal lobules and lateral temporal cortex. In total, 42% of DN voxels 
were activated in this contrast. This interaction term was also associated with a small cluster of activation 
in the FPCN, more specifically in the precuneus (1% of FPCN voxels), and some activations in the DAN 
were also detected (representing 6% of total DAN voxels), which were mostly located ventrally to the 
posterior inferior parietal lobules and corresponded to extensions of DN clusters. Outside the three masks, 
substantial activity was also found in the bilateral medial temporal lobe, including the 
hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus and amygdala. 
 
Figure 3 Panel A. illustrates the brain regions showing common and specific activation when representing reflective versus perceptual 
information in episodic and semantic memory. Panel B. illustrates the brain regions showing common and specific activation when representing 
perceptual versus reflective information in episodic and semantic memory. Both panels are displayed at p < .05 (corrected for multiple 
comparisons over masks of the networks of interest) on an inflated surface map (population average landmark surface: PALS-B12) using 
CARET software (Van Essen 2005). 
 
Single contrasts performed for each type of memory retrieval confirmed that episodic memory for 
reflective versus perceptual information was associated with DN activations, more specifically in the medial 
prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporal cortex, left temporal pole, and left inferior frontal gyrus (Fig. 3a, Table 
S8). The corresponding contrast for semantic memory (Conceptual Reflection > Scene Construction) 
revealed DN activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, lateral temporal cortex, 
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and supplemental motor area, but not in the medial prefrontal cortex. A null conjunction analysis revealed 
that these two contrasts overlapped only in the posterior middle/superior temporal gyrus (MNI coordinates: 
-50, -38, 4; cluster size k = 107; t = 6.24). 
The other interaction term [(External Element > Internal thought) > (Scene Construction > 
Conceptual Reflection)] did not reveal substantial activation in either of the three networks of interest (see 
Fig. 2c, Table S9), suggesting that the processing of perceptual information in episodic and semantic 
memory involves largely similar brain areas. To further determine the extent of overlapping activity when 
representing perceptual (versus reflective) information in episodic and sematic memory, we computed a 
null conjunction analysis: [(External Element > Internal thought) ∩ (Scene Construction > Conceptual 
Reflection)]. This analysis revealed clusters of overlapping activity in the DAN (see Fig. 3b, Table S10), 
more specifically in the bilateral frontal eye fields, dorsal precuneus, superior and anterior inferior parietal 
lobule, temporal motion complex, and right precentral sulcus. In addition, overlapping activity was found 
in the right lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior inferior parietal lobule from the FPCN. No overlapping 
activity was found in the DN. The complete sets of regions activated in each of these two contrasts are 
presented in Table S11 and S12. 
In summary, the above analyses show that the DAN and right FPCN are more activated when 
processing perceptual compared to reflective representations in both episodic and semantic memory. On 
the other hand, the recruitment of core DN areas (and in particular the medial prefrontal cortex) when 
processing reflective thoughts seems specific to episodic remembering. Additional ROI analyses confirmed 
these patterns of activation in the three networks across the four conditions and further demonstrated that 
the level of medial prefrontal and overall DN activity was highest during the episodic remembering of 
internal thoughts (see Supplemental Material).  
DISCUSSION 
The main goal of the present study was to investigate the neural correlates of the retrieval of internal 
thoughts and elements from the external environment experienced during real-life events. Our results 
showed that remembering these external and internal aspects of prior experience activated DN and FPCN 
regions that have been previously associated with episodic recollection (Addis et al. 2012; Benoit and 
Schacter 2015; Kim 2012; Moscovitch et al. 2016; Rugg and Vilberg 2013; Spreng et al. 2009). Episodic 
remembering was associated with particularly marked activity in posterior regions of the DN, which might 
support the retrieval and integration of episodic details to form coherent representations of past events 
(Addis et al. 2004; Gilmore et al. 2017; Martinelli et al. 2013). More importantly, however, episodic 
remembering was also associated with distinct activation profiles depending on the nature of the retrieved 
information: remembering external elements relied to a greater extent on the bilateral DAN and right FPCN, 
whereas memories for internal thoughts were associated with higher activity in some DN regions, notably 
the medial prefrontal and lateral temporal cortices. Our second aim was to determine whether these brain 
regions are specifically involved in remembering external versus internal elements of past episodes or 
whether they are also engaged when processing perceptual versus reflective information in semantic 
memory. We found that the DAN and FPCN were engaged when representing perceptual information in 
both episodic and semantic memory. On the other hand, the recruitment of some DN areas (particularly the 
medial prefrontal cortex) for reflective representations was specific to episodic memory. 
Previous neuroimaging studies have shown that remembering real-life events recruits an extended 
brain network mostly comprising DN and fronto-parietal areas (Addis et al. 2004, 2012; Benoit and Schacter 
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2015; Cabeza and St Jacques 2007; Kim 2012; McDermott et al. 2009; Spreng et al. 2009). This widespread 
brain activity suggests that memory for complex, real-life events involves the retrieval and binding of 
various types of information that were processed at the time of encoding, including visuo-spatial 
representations of the environment initially gathered through perceptual input and self-generated thoughts 
that were experienced during the remembered events (Andrews-Hanna, Saxe, et al. 2014). Little is known, 
however, about how self-generated thoughts are processed within episodic memory. Here we showed that 
remembering such thoughts involves specific sections of the DN: the medial prefrontal cortex and the dorsal 
medial subsystem (including the temporal pole, lateral temporal cortex, and dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex). Activity was particularly prominent in the medial prefrontal cortex, in line with previous studies 
showing activation of this region when remembering internal mentation in the context of laboratory memory 
tasks, such as previous cognitive operations performed on task stimuli (Simons et al. 2005, 2017) or source 
information about previously imagined stimuli (Turner et al. 2008).  
The medial prefrontal cortex and dorsal medial subsystem of the DN have been associated with 
reflective and introspective processes (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010; Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, et al. 
2014) and are among the key areas supporting the formation of self-generated thoughts (Christoff et al. 
2016; Fox et al. 2015; Stawarczyk and D’Argembeau 2015; Stawarczyk et al. 2011). The activation of these 
regions when remembering internal thoughts may reflect the cortical reinstatement of the brain activity 
involved in the initial formation of these thoughts during prior episodes. It is now well established that the 
brain regions supporting the encoding of external information in episodic memory are partially reactivated 
when that information is later remembered, suggesting that the process of remembering an episode involves 
returning to the brain state that was present during that particular episode (Danker and Anderson 2010). 
This reinstatement process has previously been demonstrated in sensory and temporal areas for the retrieval 
of various aspects of external stimuli (e.g., contextual associations; Danker and Anderson 2010; Gordon et 
al. 2014; Wheeler et al. 2000). Our results suggest that a similar replay of neural activity occurs in some 
DN areas when remembering internal thoughts. Studies using techniques such as multi-voxel pattern 
analyses could be conducted to further test this hypothesis, and to investigate whether the reinstatement of 
particular patterns of brain activity is involved in the remembrance of various forms of internal mentation 
such as, for instance, episodic future thoughts (Schacter et al. 2012; Szpunar 2010; Szpunar et al. 2014), 
creative ideas (Beaty et al. 2016; Ellamil et al. 2012), and counterfactual thoughts (Schacter et al. 2015; 
Van Hoeck et al. 2013).  
While our findings suggest that specific regions of the DN support the retrieval of inner thoughts, 
the precise processing operations implemented in these regions remain to be determined. In this respect, the 
role of the medial prefrontal cortex deserves further discussion. Possible explanations of the observed 
activity include that the medial prefrontal cortex represents records of cognitive operations involved in self-
generated thoughts (Simons et al., 2017), mediates self-reflection processes (Murray et al. 2012; Northoff 
et al. 2006; van der Meer et al. 2010) or mentalizing (Spreng et al. 2009; Van Overwalle 2009), or represents 
the subjective value of remembered contents (D’Argembeau 2013; Lin et al. 2016). Another possibility is 
that the observed medial prefrontal activity reflects the influence of pre-existing knowledge structures, such 
as personal goals and schemas, on memory retrieval (Gilboa and Marlatte 2017; Stawarczyk and 
D’Argembeau 2015; van Kesteren et al. 2012), which may contribute to remembering internal aspects of 
prior experience. The role of the medial prefrontal cortex in schema processing might also explain the 
intermediate level of medial prefrontal activity that was observed during scene construction in the present 
study (i.e., medial prefrontal activity in the scene construction condition was lower than in the internal 
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thought condition, but higher than in the external element condition; see Supplemental Material). Indeed, it 
is likely that in the absence of a specific past event of reference, the scenes that participants mentally 
constructed relied to a large extent on schematized knowledge about the imagined places and objects, 
whereas memories for external elements of the walk depended more on episodic details processed in the 
medial temporal lobes and posterior regions of the DN (Bonnici et al. 2013; Bonnici and Maguire 2017; 
Gilmore et al. 2017).  
Our finding that the medial prefrontal cortex showed increased activation when processing reflective 
versus perceptual representations in episodic but not semantic memory might also be related to differences 
in the personal relevance of represented contents in the two memory conditions. Indeed, in the episodic 
memory condition, remembered mentation mainly referred to personal reflections on environmental stimuli 
(46% of thoughts) or personal thoughts that were unrelated to the walk (18% of thoughts; see 
Supplementary Material), whereas the corresponding semantic memory condition required participants to 
process non-personal conceptual information (i.e., the meaning of abstract words). In future studies, it 
would thus be interesting to compare the episodic retrieval of inner thoughts with tasks that involve the 
processing of semantic representations that are more personally relevant (Renoult et al. 2012), such as 
personality trait judgments (Kelley et al. 2002) or theory of mind and other social cognition tasks (Spreng 
et al. 2009; Van Overwalle 2009). 
Another important finding of the present study is that the DAN showed higher activity when 
remembering external elements compared to internal thoughts, and also when processing perceptual versus 
reflective representations in semantic memory. There is ample evidence that the DAN supports the top-
down allocation of attention to visuo-spatial features of the external environment (Corbetta and Shulman 
2002). However, recent studies suggest that this network may not be exclusively involved in controlling 
attention to the external world but may also contribute to memory retrieval (Kragel and Polyn 2015; Wantz 
et al. 2016). Our results fit well with these findings and further suggest that DAN activity during episodic 
and semantic memory retrieval may reflect a greater focus of attention on mental representations of the 
external world rather than internal thoughts. Taken together, the present and previous findings thus suggest 
that the DAN may not only support the top-down processing of stimuli from the immediate external 
environment, but also the controlled allocation of attention to visuo-spatial features within episodic and 
semantic memory representations. This view is consistent with previous studies showing overlapping 
activation in DAN areas when orienting attention to locations in the external world or within mental 
representations (e.g., Nobre et al. 2004; Dobbins and Wagner 2005). Furthermore, our data are also in line 
with the proposal that some regions of the DAN (such as the superior parietal lobe) mediates top-down 
attention to episodic memory contents (Cabeza et al. 2008), and further suggest that such process is 
particularly engaged when attention focuses on representations of the external environment within memory 
representations. 
Interestingly, the proposal that the DAN supports top-down visuo-spatial processing for both 
external stimuli and internal representations is paralleled by recent findings showing that the DN, for its 
part, is not exclusively involved in internal mentation but can also be recruited during externally oriented 
tasks, provided that the processing of perceived stimuli can benefit from prior internal knowledge (Bar 
2004; Crittenden et al. 2015; Konishi et al. 2015; Spreng et al. 2014). Importantly, a recent study 
investigating the functional connectivity of the DN and DAN across a wide range of tasks has shown that, 
on average, the DN and DAN have an independent rather than anticorrelated relationship (Dixon et al. 
2017). When considered together with the present study, these findings suggest that the DAN and DN might 
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not consist of purely opposing networks defined by their role in processing exclusively external versus 
internal information, as is often assumed in the neuroscientific literature (e.g., Fox et al. 2005; Sestieri et 
al. 2010, 2017). Instead, a growing body of evidence suggests that the DAN and DN support different 
cognitive functions (i.e., top-down visuo-spatial processing versus the activation and manipulation of 
internal mentation or knowledge) that can be applied, in varying degrees, to the processing of both 
externally derived and internally generated representations, depending on task goals or other environmental 
circumstances (Spreng et al. 2014; Crittenden et al. 2015; Konishi et al. 2015; Kragel and Polyn 2015; 
Dixon et al. 2017).  
Finally, besides the DN and DAN, our results showed that the right FPCN was activated when 
forming episodic and semantic representations of the external environment. The FPCN is commonly 
engaged in the remembrance of complex daily life events and might support the strategic retrieval, 
monitoring, and recombination of memory details to form an integrated and coherent representation of 
remembered events (Benoit and Schacter 2015; St Jacques and Cabeza 2012; St Jacques and De Brigard 
2015). The present findings suggest that the right FPCN might be more specifically involved in the retrieval 
of perceptual memory components, in agreement with previous findings on source memory judgments 
(Dobbins and Wagner 2005). Furthermore, our results suggest that the role of the right FPCN in retrieving 
perceptual information is not restricted to episodic remembering but extends to the formation of mental 
scenes of the external environment based on semantic memory.  
To conclude, the present study provides new insights into how different aspects of prior experience 
from real-life events are processed during episodic remembering. Specifically, our findings revealed that 
the retrieval of internal versus external aspects of prior experience was associated with different activation 
profiles within large-scale brain networks: the remembrance of previous thoughts mainly relied on some 
DN areas (in particular, medial prefrontal and lateral temporal cortices), suggesting a reinstatement of the 
brain activity involved in the initial formation of these thoughts, whereas the retrieval of external elements 
recruited the right FPCN and the DAN, a set of brain areas known to support top-down visuo-spatial 
processing. Furthermore, our results showed that the DAN and right FPCN were engaged when retrieving 
information about the external environment from both episodic and semantic memory, whereas the 
recruitment of some DN areas (in particular the medial prefrontal cortex) when retrieving internal 
representations was specific to episodic memory. Future studies should be conducted to determine whether 
these distinct contributions of the DN and DAN in the processing of reflective versus perceptual information 
are specific to memories or extend to other kinds of mental representations such as, for instance, future 
thoughts (Schacter et al. 2012; Szpunar 2010; Szpunar et al. 2014) or counterfactual thoughts (Schacter et 
al. 2015; Van Hoeck et al. 2013). Furthermore, it would also be interesting to investigate whether the brain 
networks supporting memory for internal mentation versus external stimuli evolve with age. Indeed, older 
adults tend to remember more thoughts, but fewer perceptual and spatial details, than younger adults 
(Hashtroudi et al. 1990), suggesting that aging might be associated with a shift in the balance between 
perceptual and reflective information within episodic memory representations (Maillet and Rajah 2014). 
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Supplementary Material  
Supplementary Results 
fMRI task performance 
The time needed to access information differed between conditions [F(3, 78) = 10.15; p < .001; η
  
= .28], with post-hoc tests showing that response times (RTs) were slower in the external element than in 
the internal thought condition, and slower in the conceptual reflection condition than in both the internal 
thought and scene construction conditions (all p’s < .05, Bonferroni corrected). Although these differences 
in RTs were statistically significant, it should be noted that they were relatively small compared to the 
duration of the main phase of each trial that was modelled in the fMRI analyses, with the largest difference 
being tasks being less than 800 ms (representing a difference of 6% in the mean duration of trials between 
conditions; see Table S2).  
 
Post-scan Debriefing 
In their answer to the Likert scales in the post-scan debriefing, participants reported that they 
somewhat suspected that the walk would be followed by a memory task (M = 4.58; SD = 1.45), although 
none of them knew what the nature of this task would be or reported to expect that they will be asked to 
remember their thoughts in the scanner. There was a significant difference in the subjective ratings of 
difficulty between conditions [F(3, 78) = 5.51; p = .002; η
  = .17], with post-hoc tests revealing that the 
scene construction condition was judged easier than the two episodic memory conditions (both p’s < .05, 
Bonferroni corrected, see Table S3 for descriptive statistics); note, however, that difficulty ratings were 
below the midpoint of the scale (i.e., 4 corresponding to ‘moderately easy/difficult’) for all conditions, 
suggesting that participants experienced no difficulty in generating the required mental representations. The 
number of times in which participants reported having erroneously retrieved the same information in 
different trials was very low and did not differ between the two memory conditions [t(26) = .08; p = .94; 
Cohen’s d = .02], the number of times that participants reported having remembered something shown on 
the pictures for the external element condition (rather than an additional element as specified by the 
instructions) was also very low (M = 0.37; SD = 0.95). Finally, the Likert scales confirmed that the scenes 
imagined by the participants in the scene construction condition did not involve memories of specific events 
(M = 1.59; SD = 0.75), indicating that, as requested, participants were able to mentally construct scenes that 
were uncontaminated by episodic details from specific past events. 
Finally, to get an idea of the kind of episodic details that were recalled during the fMRI session, we 
analyzed the content of the five internal thoughts and five external elements trials that the participants were 
asked to describe in the post-scan debriefing. The external elements were classified into two categories: (1) 
‘objects’ when the memories were mainly focused on inanimate objects such as cars, busses, or (parts of) 
buildings and construction sites, and (2) ‘person’ when the memories were mainly focused on a single or a 
group of individuals. The internal thoughts were classified into three categories: (1) ‘Instruction-related’ 
when the participants were thinking about what they had to do during the walk (e.g., wondering which way 
to take to go to the cafeteria after buying the newspaper), (2) ‘stimulus-dependent’ when the content of the 
thoughts was related to something that the participants directly perceived (e.g., thinking that the current 
weather was nice for an outside walk), and (3) ‘stimulus-independent’ when the content of the thought was 
focused on something that the participants were not directly perceiving (e.g., thinking about what to do after 
the experiment). Descriptions for 25 participants (data for two participants were missing) were classified 
by two independent raters (DS and OJ) and the interrater agreement was good for both conditions, with a 
Cohen’s κ = .98 for external elements and .74 for internal thoughts. Of the 125 external element trials, 55% 
referred to objects and 38% to people, and participant reported that they did not exactly remember what 
they retrieved in the scanner for the remaining 6% of trials. For the internal thoughts, 27% were instruction-
related, 46% were stimulus-dependent, and 18% were stimulus-independent; no responses were given for 
the remaining 8% of trials. These proportions of internal thoughts are consistent with previous studies on 
the occurrence of different types of thoughts during task performance (e.g., Stawarczyk et al. 2011). 
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ROI analyses of parameter estimates for each network of interest 
To further determine the pattern of brain activity in the three networks of interest across the four 
conditions, we extracted the parameter estimates for each condition in each of the three masks from Yeo et 
al. 2011 (see Methods). For each network, we then computed a 2 Memory (episodic versus semantic) × 2 
Representation (perceptual versus reflective) ANOVAs on the extracted parameter estimates (see Fig. S1). 
For the DAN, the ANOVA revealed significant main effects of memory type [F(1, 26) = 18.73; p < .001; 
η
  = .42] and representation type [F(1, 26) = 32.85; p < .001; η
  = .81], but no interaction [F(1, 26) = .30; 
p = .59; η
  = .01]. Similarly, the ANOVA for the FPCN revealed significant main effects of memory type 
[F(1, 26) = 17.24; p < .001; η
  = .40] and representation type [F(1, 26) = 25.76; p < .001; η
  = .50], but no 
interaction [F(1, 26) = .79; p = .38; η
  = .03]. The ANOVA for the DN showed a different pattern of results 
with a significant main effect of memory type [F(1, 26) = 93.86; p < .001; η
  = .76] and a significant 
interaction [F(1, 26) = 127.74; p < .001; η
  = .83], but no main effect of representation type [F(1, 26) = 
.86; p = .36; η
  = .03]. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences between 
each of the four conditions in DN activity (all p’s < .001, except p = .008 for the difference between the 
scene construction and external element conditions). As shown on Fig. S1, DN activity was highest when 
retrieving internal thoughts from episodic memory.  
Finally, we also extracted the parameter estimates for each condition in the medial prefrontal cortex, 
based on an anatomical mask built from the AAL atlas (Rolls et al. 2015; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002). An 
ANOVA on these parameters estimates (see panel D on Fig. S1) revealed a significant main effect of 
memory type [F(1, 26) = 25.27; p < .001; η
  = .49] and a significant interaction [F(1, 26) = 127.74; p < 
.001; η
  = .83], but no effect of memory type [F(1, 26) < .001 ; p = .98; η
  < .001]. Post-hoc analyses 
revealed significant differences between all of the four conditions (all p’s < .01, Bonferroni corrected). As 
can be seen from Fig. S1, medial prefrontal activity was highest when retrieving internal thoughts from 
episodic memory.  
 
Figure S1. Mean parameter estimates for each experimental condition in each network of interest and in 
the mPFC  
 
Note: DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FPCN = Fronto-parietal control network; 




Table S1. Words used in the semantic memory conditions 
 Scene Construction Conceptual Reflection 
 French English translation French English translation 
1. Oreiller Pillow Dilemme Dilemma 
2. Imprimante Printer Permission Permission 
3. Chaussette Sock Hâte Haste 
4. Balançoire Swing Avenir Future 
5. Lampe Lamp Solution Solution 
6. Pinceau Paintbrush Volonté Will 
7. Cravate Necktie Catégorie Category 
8. Bateau Boat Exigence Demand 
9. Balle Ball Durée Duration 
10. Peigne Comb Concept Concept 
11. Ceinture Belt Opinion Opinion 
12. Ciseaux Scissors Ordinaire Ordinary 
13. Cartable Schoolbag Propos Remarks 
14. Frigidaire Fridge Progrès Progress 
15. Aspirateur Vacuum Introduction Introduction 
16. Étagère Shelf Compromis Compromise 
17. Miroir Mirror Simplicité Simplicity 
18. Cadenas Padlock Variation Variation 
19. Drapeau Flag Mystère Mystery 
20. Guitare Guitar Format Format 
21. Téléviseur Television Inverse Opposite 
22. Couvercle Lid Pouvoir Power 
23. Bague Ring (jewelry) Conséquence Consequence 





Table S2: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the indices of task performance and responses 
to the post-scan debriefing questionnaire. 
 
 






Key press (%) 97.84 (3.72) 96.91 (4.71) 97.99 (3.34) 97.99 (4.23) 
Trial duration (ms) 12,735 (1085) 13,199 (958) 12,888 (1149) 12,408 (1214) 
EE rating 3.68 (0.28) 1.55 (0.45) / / 
IT rating 1.42 (0.36) 3.74 (0.23) / / 
VI rating / / 3.82 (0.24) 1.27 (0.29) 
IS rating / / 1.26 (0.32) 3.84 (0.24) 
Subjective difficulty 3.33(1.36) 2.93 (1.36) 1.89 (2.05) 2.78 (1.45) 
Similar memories 1.74 (1.48) 1.72 (1.36) / / 
Note: EE = external element, IT = internal thought, VI = visual imagery, IS = inner speech. The scores of the EE, IT, VI, and IS rating made 
during the task ranged from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 4 ‘a lot.’ The scores for the post-scan subjective difficulty ratings ranged from 1 = ‘very easy’ to 
7 = ‘very difficult.’ Similar memories are the mean number of times that the participants reported in the post-scan debriefing having remembered 




Table S3. Brain regions showing increased activity for perceptual vs reflective representations 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
pIPL L -34 -80 36 86 10.34 
 R 48 -70 28 34 8.08 
Precuneus / PCC L/R -4 -40 48 30 8.20 
 L -10 -58 48 23 7.19 
 L -18 -60 22 72 6.08 
SMG/aIPL R 54 -44 32 62 6.59 
Rostral lPFC R 20 62 10 55 7.88 
Dorsal lPFC R 34 26 46 140 7.01 
2. DAN clusters       
FEF L -28 -6 52 393 11.42 
 R 32 0 52 436 12.08 
Precuneus / aIPL / pIPL / SPL / Middle 
OC / MT+ 
L/R -8 -64 58 2715 10.00 
 -38 -84 30  10.94 
  14 -68 48  10.22 
  38 -42 48  8.68 
  46 -78 28  7.89 
  58 -48 -10  7.77 
aIPL / SPL L -58 -32 42 401 8.17 
MT+ L -56 -66 4 124 8.58 
Prec. Sulcus R 42 6 26 259 10.18 
3. FPCN clusters       
Prec. Sulcus / Dorsal lPFC / Rostral 
lPFC 
R 24 14 58 1549 11.28 
 44 8 38  8.57 
  44 32 22  8.25 
  36 32 42  7.56 
  46 40 12  7.52 
  24 58 12  7.46 
Dorsal lPFC L -26 6 58 57 6.48 
Precuneus L/R -8 -62 50 50 8.63 
 L/R 2 -38 44 47 7.83 
SPL / Middle OC R 30 -72 48 62 6.84 
SMG / aIPL R 52 -34 44 513 11.14 
Dorsal ACC / mPFC R 8 34 32 32 6.13 
4. Other clusters      
PHC L -36 -26 -18 427 11.94 
 R 34 -28 -18 116 8.92 
Insula L -46 -10 0 47 7.91 
Cerebellum L -40 -50 38 25 7.49 
Note: ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; aIPL = anterior inferior parietal lobule; DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FEF 
= Frontal eye fields; FPCN = Frontoparietal control network; lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; MT+ = Temporal motion complex; OC = 
Occipital cortex; PCC = Posterior Cingulate Cortex; PHC = Parahippocampal cortex; pIPL = Posterior inferior parietal lobule; Prec. Sulcus = 
Precentral sulcus; SMG = Supramarginal gyrus; SPL = Superior parietal lobule. p < .05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons over masks 




Table S4. Brain regions showing increased activity for reflective vs perceptual representations 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
MTG / STG L -50 -38 4 327 10.51 
SMA L/R -4 12 68 115 8.94 
Ventral lPFC L -46 22 -10 321 8.78 
Temporal Pole L -54 8 -14 36 7.98 
2. DAN clusters       
 / / / / / / 
3. FPCN clusters       
 / / / / / / 
4. Other clusters      
OC L -32 80 -10 1108 10.56 
 R 38 -82 0 608 8.57 
Cuneus / Superior OC L -10 -94 30 33 7.24 
Prec. Sulcus / Dorsal lPFC L -44 4 48 37 6.87 
SMA L/R -4 4 62 353 8.54 
Cerebellum L -18 -62 -20 36 6.85 
 R 32 -58 26 460 8.78 
Note: DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FPCN = Frontoparietal control network; lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; 
MTG = middle temporal gyrus; OC = Occipital Cortex; SMA = Supplementary motor area; STG = Superior temporal gyrus. p < .05 (FWE 
corrected for multiple comparisons over masks of the networks of interest or over the whole brain for the clusters falling outside these masks) 





Table S5. Brain regions showing increased activity for episodic vs semantic memory retrieval 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
pIPL / aIPL L -34 -80 36 581 8.60 
  -48 -58 26  7.58 
 R 44 -70 32 759 11.47 
  50 -52 40  7.12 
Rsp / PCC / Precuneus L/R 16 -54 18 2287 12.91 
  10 -46 36  12.19 
mPFC L/R 8 48 -6 220 7.12 
 L/R 8 48 18 32 5.71 
 L -12 50 10 63 5.83 
MTG L -62 -18 -10 57 6.21 
 R 60 -28 -8 62 6.60 
 R 54 -8 -18 21 5.75 
PHC L -28 -32 -16 23 7.30 
Dorsal lPFC L -24 -28 42 76 7.69 
 R 26 28 44 167 7.66 
Rostral lPFC R 24 64 10 24 5.66 
2. DAN clusters       
pIPL / Middle OC L -36 -84 32 71 8.42 
 R 40 -72 30 106 10.83 
Precuneus L/R 10 -74 50 564 8.74 
3. FPCN clusters       
pIPL / Middle OC R 40 -78 40 226 8.15 
Precuneus L/R 14 -62 30 253 10.95 
 L/R 8 -42 40 52 9.42 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L/R -4 26 30 69 9.01 
Dorsal lPFC R 40 22 36 67 8.00 
 R 26 20 48 151 6.43 
Rostral lPFC R 32 58 8 225 7.30 
4. Other clusters       
PHC / Hippocampus R 34 -38 -10 480 9.90 
PHC / Hippocampus L -30 -44 -8 423 11.65 
Note: aIPL = anterior inferior parietal lobule; DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FPCN = Frontoparietal control network; 
lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; mPFC = Medial prefrontal cortex; MTG = Middle temporal gyrus; OC = Occipital cortex; PCC = Posterior 
Cingulate Cortex; PHC = Parahippocampal cortex; pIPL = Posterior inferior parietal lobule; Rsp = Retrosplenial cortex. p < .05 (FWE corrected 
for multiple comparisons over masks of the networks of interest or over the whole brain for the clusters falling outside these masks) with a 





Table S6. Brain regions showing increased activity for semantic vs episodic memory retrieval  
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
Ventral lPFC L -54 14 12 231 6.53 
2. DAN clusters       
aIPL L -46 -36 42 257 6.96 
SPL R 22 -52 70 47 5.93 
MT+ / ITG / Middle OC / inferior OC L -46 -50 -18 411 8.53 
 -40 -66 0  7.62 
Prec. Sulcus L -50 6 24 110 8.96 
 L -42 -4 50 21 6.20 
 R 58 10 32 40 6.85 
Postc. Sulcus R 60 -20 48 37 6.80 
3. FPCN clusters       
Prec. Sulcus / Ventral lPFC L -48 10 24 53 8.21 
Ventral lPFC L -50 36 12 195 7.67 
4. Other clusters       
OC L -40 -68 -2 468 8.87 
 L -34 -88 10 31 6.86 
 R 44 -70 -2 652 8.17 
SMG L -56 -40 24 131 8.37 
 R 42 -34 22 83 7.47 
Cerebellum L -8 -54 -12 105 7.99 
 R 28 -66 22 135 8.13 
SMA L/R 0 0 64 253 7.29 
Prec. Sulcus / Ventral lPFC L -52 8 24 570 9.63 
Postc. Sulcus R 32 -40 72 144 7.24 
Note: aIPL = anterior inferior parietal lobule; DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FPCN = Frontoparietal control network; 
ITG = Inferior temporal gyrus; lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; OC = Occipital cortex; Postc. Sulcus = Postcentral sulcus; Prec. Sulcus = 
Precentral sulcus; SMA = Supplementary motor area; SMG = Supramarginal gyrus; SPL = Superior parietal lobule. p < .05 (FWE corrected 
for multiple comparisons over masks of the networks of interest or over the whole brain for the clusters falling outside these masks) with a 
minimum cluster size of 20 voxels.   
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 Table S7. Brain regions showing increased activity for reflective vs perceptual representations during 
episodic compared to semantic memory retrieval [(Internal Thought > External Element) > (Conceptual 
Reflection > Scene Construction)] 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
pIPL L -48 -72 30 454 12.85 
 R 50 -60 28 674 10.31 
Rsp / PCC / Precuneus L/R 14 -44 34 1609 10.81 
  -6 -52 14  9.71 
mPFC L/R -2 54 10 2762 9.93 
  -2 48 24  9.47 
  8 50 -12  9.42 
Dorsal mPFC R 14 48 40 27 5.95 
MTG L -62 -18 -14 159 7.41 
MTG / ITG R 58 -12 24 409 8.51 
PHC L -28 -32 -16 27 10.35 
Dorsal lPFC L -24 28 46 141 7.47 
Rostral lPFC L -18 62 10 29 6.33 
Orbitofrontal cortex R 40 32 -14 22 6.49 
2. DAN clusters       
pIPL / Middle OC L -46 -78 28 91 11.20 
 L -44 -70 20 46 8.15 
pIPL / Middle OC / MTG R 46 -62 20 230 7.43 
Fusiform Gyrus R 44 -44 -18 28 5.87 
3. FPCN clusters       
Precuneus R 4 -42 40 53 10.28 
4. Other clusters       
PHC / Hippocampus L -28 -34 -16 276 10.89 
 R 26 -28 -18 184 9.77 
SMG R 60 -30 -30 25 6.75 
Insula R 40 -10 -10 20 6.55 
Amygdala L -30 2 -18 99 10.07 
 R 34 2 16 39 7.47 
Orbitofrontal cortex L -26 34 -14 23 7.11 
Note: DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FPCN = Frontoparietal control network; ITG = Inferior temporal cortex; lPFC 
= Lateral prefrontal cortex; mPFC = Medial Prefrontal Cortex; MTG = Middle temporal gyrus; OC = Occipital cortex; PCC = Posterior 
Cingulate Cortex; PHC = Parahippocampal Cortex; pIPL = Posterior inferior parietal lobule; Rsp = Retrosplenial Cortex; SMG = Supramarginal 
gyrus. p < .05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons over masks of the networks of interest or over the whole brain for the clusters falling 





Table S8.  DN activity for reflective vs perceptual representations within each type of memory retrieval 
(episodic and semantic) 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. Internal Thoughts > External Elements 
Dorsal mPFC L/R -2  58 22 171 8.83 
mPFC L/R -4 40 -8 311 7.5 
  -4 54 -2  5.22 
MTG / STG L -50 -36 -2 205 7.99 
MTG R 54 -20 -12 22 5.87 
 R 56 -30 4 20 5.75 
Temporal Pole L -54 4 -16 299 7.83 
Ventral lPFC L -40 26 -6 42 5.65 
2. Conceptual Reflection > Scene Construction 
MTG / STG L -52 -40 6 303 10.50 
SMA L -6 16 68 123 9.28 
Ventral lPFC L -46 22 -2 431 9.26 
Dorsal lPFC L -40 6 46 23 6.58 
Note: lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; mPFC = Medial prefrontal cortex; MTG = Middle Temporal Gyrus; SMA = Supplementary motor area; 
STG = Superior temporal gyrus. p < .05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons over the DN mask) with a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels. 
 
Table S9. Brain regions showing increased activity for perceptual vs reflective representations during 
episodic compared to semantic memory retrieval [(External Element > Internal thought) > (Scene 
Construction > Conceptual Reflection)] 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
MTG / STG L -52 -42 4 34 6.47 
Ventral lPFC L -54 14 12 136 7.43 
 L -46 24 -4 55 6.47 
2. DAN clusters       
  / / / / / 
3. FPCN clusters       
Prec. Sulcus / Ventral lPFC L -48 12 28 171 9.41 
4. Other clusters       
OC L -26 -96 -4 149 7.92 
 R 34 -92 -4 233 7.42 
Cerebellum R 30 -60 -30 206 8.22 
Note: DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FPCN = Frontoparietal control network; lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; 
MTG = Middle temporal gyrus; OC = Occipital cortex; Prec. Sulcus = Precentral Sulcus; STG = Superior temporal gyrus. p < .05 (FWE 
corrected for multiple comparisons over masks of the networks of interest or over the whole brain for the clusters falling outside these masks) 




Table S10. Brain regions showing common activity when representing perceptual vs reflective information 
in episodic and semantic memory (External Element > Internal thought) ∩ (Scene Construction > 
Conceptual Reflection) 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
 / / / / / / 
2. DAN clusters       
FEF L -24 -6 52 228 6.59 
 R 22 -4 60 310 6.48 
Precuneus / SPL L -10 -66 54 281 7.68 
 R 14 -70 48 62 6.37 
 R 8 -64 60 18 5.22 
aIPL L -32 -42 44 99 6.12 
 R 36 -44 50 219 6.64 
pIPL/ Middle OC R 38 -76 30 62 6.84 
Middle OC L -40 -86 26 14 5.85 
Prec. Sulcus R 11 8 26 150 7.05 
MT+ L -64 -52 8 18 5.41 
 R 58 -48 -10 9 5.11 
3. FPCN clusters       
Dorsal lPFC R 26 14 56 119 6.56 
 R 46 32 22 46 6.08 
 R 36 32 42 9 5.19 
aIPL R 46 -46 50 87 5.73 
4. Other clusters       
 / / / / / / 
Note: aIPL = Anterior inferior parietal lobule; DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FEF = Frontal eye fields; FPCN = 
Frontoparietal control network; lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; MT+ = Temporal motion complex; OC = Occipital cortex; pIPL = Posterior 
inferior parietal lobule; Prec. Sulcus = Precentral Sulcus; SPL = Superior parietal lobule. p < .05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons 




Table S11. Brain activity for external vs internal representations within episodic memory (External Element 
> Internal Thoughts) 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
 / / / / / / 
2. DAN clusters       
FEF L -24 -4 60 329 8.84 
 R 28 4 54 395 9.27 
aIPL / SPL L -34 -46 46 191 6.40 
 R 36 -44 46 340 7.83 
  38 -54 48  5.71 
MT+ L -56 -64 -6 31 5.99 
 R 56 -48 8 52 7.25 
Prec. Sulcus L -44 2 32 31 7.31 
 R 46 8 24 138 6.81 
Precuneus / SPL L -12 -62 54 422 6.68 
  -22 -64 48  6.56 
 R 14 -62 52 185 6.04 
pIPL / Middle OC L -40 -86 26 28 6.50 
 R 36 -76 34 59 6.39 
3. FPCN clusters       
Dorsal lPFC L -22 10 64 28 5.59 
 L -40 32 36 110 6.13 
 R 30 6 58 179 9.53 
 R 40 32 30 352 8.08 
aIPL / SMG R 44 -42 44 191 8.37 
4. Other clusters       
 / / / / / / 
Note: aIPL = Anterior inferior parietal lobule; DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FEF = Frontal eye fields; FPCN = 
Frontoparietal control network; lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; MT+ = Temporal motion complex; OC = Occipital cortex; pIPL = Posterior 
inferior parietal lobule; Prec. Sulcus = Precentral Sulcus; SMG = Supramarginal gyrus; SPL = Superior parietal lobule. p < .05 (FWE corrected 




Table S12. Brain activity for external vs internal representations within semantic memory (Scene 
Construction > Conceptual Reflection) 
  MNI coordinates   
Brain regions Side x y z Cluster Size t 
1. DN clusters       
pIPL L -36 -78 34 212 12.83 
pIPL / aIPL R 42 -70 38 679 7.78 
  52 -46 34  6.67 
Rsp / PCC / Precuneus L/R -6 -52 14 1423 10.53 
  4 -64 30  6.97 
  -10 -52 50  8.57 
MTG R 62 -14 -20 45 6.76 
PHC L -28 -32 -16 28 10.38 
mPFC L/R 6 38 -12 1569 6.73 
  -8 40 0  7.54 
  16 64 10  9.38 
  6 44 26  6.36 
Dorsal lPFC L -26 30 42 174 9.54 
 R 32 28 44 257 8.10 
Rostral lPFC L -20 62 8 20 6.48 
2. DAN clusters       
FEF L -26 -8 48 298 8.93 
 R 28 -4 50 403 7.88 
Precuneus / SPL L/R -8 -66 54 1042 11.34 
  -18 -64 60  6.48 
  30 -68 58  5.19 
aIPL L -42 -32 36 327 7.10 
 R 34 -38 42 361 6.88 
Middle OC / MTG L -44 -70 20 52 7.60 
  -48 -66 8  5.28 
Middle OC / MTG / MT + R 40 -74 30 476 9.99 
 54 -56 8  7.48 
MT+ L -56 -66 -4 65 6.51 
Prec. Sulcus R 42 6 26 236 8.24 
Postc. Sulcus R 54 -28 46 25 6.56 
ITG / Fusiform Gyrus R 46 -42 -14 51 6.01 
3. FPCN clusters       
Precuneus L/R -8 -62 50 91 11.04 
  4 -38 42 52 10.19 
Dorsal lPFC R 48 40 12 369 8.37 
  24 20 46 515 7.96 
  44 6 38  7.81 
Rostral lPFC R 24 58 12 91 7.41 
SMG / aIPL / pIPL R 56 -34 40 360 7.80 
  36 -72 42  7.65 
MTG / ITG R 62 -46 -10 25 7.12 
4. Other clusters       
PHC / Hippocampus L -32 -34 -12 604 16.18 
 R 34 -30 14 414 11.42 
Amygdala L -30 2 -18 49 8.03 
 R 34 0 16 128 7.83 
Insula L -42 -8 0 164 8.03 
Orbitofrontal cortex R -28 36 -14 39 8.67 
Note: aIPL = Anterior inferior parietal lobule; DAN = Dorsal attention network; DN = Default network; FEF = Frontal eye fields; FPCN = 
Frontoparietal control network; ITG = Inferior temporal gyrus; lPFC = Lateral prefrontal cortex; mPFC = Medial prefrontal cortex; MT+ = 
Temporal motion complex; MTG = Middle temporal gyrus; OC = Occipital cortex; PCC = Posterior cingulate cortex; PHC = Parahippocampal 
cortex; pIPL = Posterior inferior parietal lobule; Postc. Sulcus = Postcentral sulcus; Prec. Sulcus = Precentral Sulcus; Rsp = Retrosplenial 
cortex; SMG = Supramarginal gyrus; SPL = Superior parietal lobule. p < .05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons over masks of the 
networks of interest or over the whole brain for the clusters falling outside these masks) with a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels. 
 
